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CASE COMMENTS
Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara-The Western Sa-
hara was not terra nullius when colonized by Spain in 1884, but
neither Morocco nor Mauritania proved the existence of legal ties
sufficient to establish sovereignty over the territory.
INTRODUCTION
The acquisition and maintenance of title by a sovereign over
territory has frequently been the subject of international legal
controversy. Numerous decisions of the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice, the International Court of Justice, and var-
ious arbitral tribunals have attempted to delineate the modes of
acquisition of sovereignty and the acts required to effectively es-
tablish possession.' The recent territorial dispute over the former
Spanish protectorate known as the Western or Spanish Sahara
2
prompted the reexamination of these concepts by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. At the request of the United Nations
General Assembly," the Court prepared the Advisory Opinion on
1. See, e.g., Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal-India),
[1960] I.C.J. 6 (merits); Case concerning Sovereignty over certain Frontier Land
(Belgium-Netherlands), [1959] I.C.J. 209; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case
(Norway-Denmark), [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53; Clipperton Island Arbitration
(France-Mexico), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1107 (1931); Palmas Island Arbitration (Netherlands-
United States), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928). United States courts have frequently utilized
international legal principles when presented with boundary disputes. See note 87 infra.
2. This territory covers an area of 105,400 square miles in northwestern Africa. C.
GALLAC.HER, THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA 208 (1963). It is bordered by the Atlan-
tic Ocean to the northwest, by Morocco to the north, by Mauritania to the southwest, and,
for eighteen miles, by Algeria to the west. It is sparsely populated by approximately 75,000
nomadic tribesmen known as the Sahaouis. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § 4, at 2, col. 2.
These inhabitants hold "no particular national allegiance." Id., Jan. 30, 1976, at 1, col.
4.
3. G.A. Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 103, 104, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
The Court's power to give advisory opinions derives from the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. Article 65 reads, inter alia:
The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations to make such a request.
I.C.J. STAT. art. 65, para. 2. The authority contemplated by the Statute is granted to the
General Assembly in Article 96 of the Charter: "The General Assembly ... may request
the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question." U.N.
CHARTER art. 96, para. 1. The General Assembly is required to present to the Court
[q]uestions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked . . . by
means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question upon
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the Western Sahara.4 In denying the claims of both Morocco and
Mauritania, the two States vying for control of the territory, the
Court retrenched from its earlier opinions and decisions by in-




Considerable phosphate deposits make the Western Sahara
a valuable territory.' Until 1884, it was uncolonized and divided
into two regions-Rio de Oro in the south and Sakiet El Hamra
in the north-which had been occupied by various nomadic tribes
for many centuries. Pursuant to a royal order of December 26,
1884, 7 Spain proclaimed a protectorate over a portion of the
coastal zone of Rio de Oro.' By 1958, Spain had expanded its
occupation so that it controlled the entire Western Sahara terri-
tory, and it became a province of Spain.9
which an opinion is required, and accompanied by all documents likely to throw
light upon the question.
I.C.J. STAT. art. 65, para. 2.
4. [1975] I.C.J. 12.
5. However, it should not be concluded that the opinion had no pragmatic effect upon
the controversy. Immediately following its announcement on October 16, 1975, King Has-
san II of Morocco declared that he would lead a march of 350,000 unarmed Moroccans
into the Western Sahara to claim the territory for Morocco. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1975, at
1, col. 4. The march occurred in early November, and the marchers met with no resistance
from Spanish troops: Id., Nov. 7, 1975, at 1, col. 2. A few days later, Morocco complied
with a request of the United Nations Security Council to withdraw from the territory, Id.,
Nov. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 4. On November 14, Spain agreed, in a pact with Morocco and
Mauritania, to abandon the Western Sahara by the end of February. A referendum was
to be held after Spain's departure, under Moroccan and Mauritanian control. Id., Nov.
15, 1975, at 1, col. 2. The agreement seemed to bypass the United Nations, since it did
not provide a role for the world body. Id., Nov. 16, 1975, at 9, col. 1. On February 26, 1976,
Spain formally withdrew from the territory. However, a referendum was not immediately
held, and joint administration over the territory by Morocco and Mauritania was insti-
tuted. Memorandum of Feb. 25, 1976, from the Spanish Government to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Press Release SG/SM/2306, Feb. 26, 1976, at 3.
6. Although a windswept desert, the Western Sahara is rich in phosphates which are
primarily used in the production of fertilizer. In 1974 it ranked behind the United States,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Morocco as the world's fourth largest phos-
phate producer. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1975, at 37, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,1975,
§ 3, at 3, col. 1.
7. [1975] I.C.J. 38.
8. The Spanish government claimed the land between Cape Bojador and Cape Blanc,
two coastal cities in Rio de Oro, and actually occupied the coastal site of Villa Cisneros.
13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrrANNICA 173 (15th ed. 1974).
9. 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 360y (int'l ed. 1971).
CASE COMMENTS
A. General Assembly Resolutions
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514,10 passed
in 1960, is the basic statement of that body on the issue of de-
colonization of "non-self-governing" territories." Entitled the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples, it recognized the recent transformation of
many former territories into independent nations and proclaimed
"the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. ... 1 The Res-
olution provided that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
determination" and that "immediate steps" should be taken to
grant independence to the peoples of "all.. . territories which
have not yet attained independence ....
These principles have been restated in a number of resolu-
tions passed in the last ten years. Resolution 271114 of December
14, 1970, pertains exclusively to the Western Sahara. Reaffirming
past resolutions, particularly Resolution 1514, the General
Assembly "calls upon" the Spanish government as administering
power "to create the atmosphere of d~tente" required to imple-
ment a referendum which would allow the people of the Western
Sahara to "exercise their right to self-determination and to free-
dom of choice .... 15
B. Legal Claims
In September, 1974, Morocco proposed that the issue of sov-
ereignty over the Western Sahara be submitted to the Court. 6
10. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
11. See 29 U.N. GAOR 76, 87, U.N. Doc. AIPV.2249 (1974).
12. 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 67.
13. Id. General Assembly Resolution 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960), passed the following day, reaffirmed the principles of Resolution 1514 and
stated them more explicitly. Principle VI of the Annex states:
A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure
of self-government by:
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State;
(b) Free association with an independent State; or
(c) Integration with an independent State.
14. G.A. Res. 2711, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 100, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
15. Id. at 101. A referendum was never conducted. See note 5 supra.
16. Letter of Sept. 23, 1974, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, contained within note verbale of the same date from
the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, Implemen-
tation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/9771, at 2 (1974).
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Morocco and Mauritania both claimed rights to the territory. In
the months following the Moroccan proposal, the General Assem-
bly was used as a forum by the States involved in the controversy
to pursue their respective legal claims.
Morocco contended that Spain had spoken of decolonization
for ten years but nevertheless had continued to maintain "colo-
nial dominion and exploitation" of the Western Sahara,"7 as evi-
denced by Spain's occupation force which numbered between
70,000 and 80,000.' s Morocco emphasized that on the basis of
historical, legal, ethnic, and cultural ties, it had always consid-
ered the area to be an integral part of its own national territory.'
It indicated that it would be able to present evidence to the Court
demonstrating territorial contiguity and continuity, as well as
evidence relating favorably to the nature of the settlement of the
area. In addition, Morocco alleged it could establish that prior to
Spanish colonization it had exercised sovereignty over the terri-
tory "in accordance with the conditions laid down by public inter-
national law. '2 For example, Morocco hoped to prove that it had
regarded the area as an integral part of its territory without inter-
ruption and had, in effect, unequivocally assumed the adminis-
tration of the territory.2'
Mauritania relied on similar criteria in asserting its rights to
the territory. In statements made before the General Assembly,
the Mauritanian representative argued that the Western Sahara
is inhabited solely by Mauritanian tribes differing in no way
from other tribes living in the north-western part of independent
Mauritania. Indeed, they have everything in common: their
language-Hassania, a Mauritanian Arab dialect; culture, race
and customs. 2
Furthermore, Mauritania maintained that the daily activities
17. 29 U.N. GAOR 76, supra note 11, at 91. The Moroccan respresentative stressed
that it was Morocco which had taken the initiative to place the issue on the agenda in
the fall of 1964. Id. at 87. Referring to General Assembly Resolution 2072, 20 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 14, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), unanimously approved (with the exception of
Spain and Portugal), which "urgently requests" Spain to negotiate toward immediate
liberation of the territory, Morocco asserted that it was Spain which refused to negotiate.
29 U.N. GAOR 76, supra note 11, at 87.
18. 29 U.N. GAOR 76, supra note 11, at 91.
19. Id. at 95.
20. 4th Comm. Summary Record, 29 U.N. GAOR 188, 190, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2117
(1974).
21. Id.
22. 29 U.N. GAOR 67, 81, U.N. Doc. AIPV.2251 (1974).
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and "Nomadic nature" of the Saharan inhabitants were no differ-
ent than those of tribes living in Mauritania.
23
Spain repeatedly stated its intention to hold a referendum in
the territory under United Nations supervision, in accordance
with Resolution 316224 and previous resolutions on the Sahara
issue. 25 It assured the General Assembly that it intended "to re-
spect the will of the Saharan people. 126 Nevertheless, Morocco
remained unsatisfied by the speed with which Spain was
progressing toward decolonization.
2 7
Although Algeria did not assert any legal claim to the terri-
tory, it also used the General Assembly as a forum to present its
position with regard to the Western Sahara. Since it borders the
territory, Algeria asserted that its interest was "based on obvious
geopolitical considerations and on the need for regional unity,
[and] did not go beyond its legitimate national concerns.
' 'r
23. Id. Such tribes supposedly existed prior to Africa's colonization and in some cases
had "reached a state of development resembling that of a modem State." 4th Comm.
Summary Record, 29 U.N. GAOR 188, 199, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2117 (1974). The Bilad
Shinguitti, the group of tribes which later became the Mauritanian entity, inhabited the
Western Sahara during the nineteenth century. See text accompanying notes 71-75 infra.
They resisted French and Spanish colonization, and, upon defeat, concluded treaties with
them. Thus, in Mauritania's view, the Western Sahara,
like all other African territories, was not without rulers at the time it was
colonized. The term "free territory," as understood at the notorious Berlin con-
ference on the partition of Africa, could hardly refer to a territory devoid of
rulers. It meant rather a territory free from any colonization.
4th Comm. Summary Record, 29 U.N. GAOR 188, 199, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2117 (1974).
Mauritania asserted that it would be able to present evidence to the Court demonstrating
Mauritanian ties with the territory based upon "legal, human, geographical, ethnic and
cultural levels," and a deep attachment of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara with
Mauritania. Id.
24. G.A. Res. 3162, 28 GAOR Supp. 30, at 110, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
25. 29 U.N. GAOR 58, 59-60, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2253 (1974); 4th Comm. Summary
Record, 29 U.N. GAOR 253, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2126 (1974).
26. 29 U.N. GAOR 58, 59-60, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2253 (1974). Its representative fre-
quently referred to his letter of September 13, 1974, to the Chairman of the Fourth
Committee, which embodied these principles. Id.; 4th Comm. Summary Record, 29 U.N.
GAOR 253, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2126 (1974).
27. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
28. 4th Comm. Summary Record, 29 U.N. GAOR 247, 250, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2125
(1974). Algeria supported the call of a referendum for the Saharan inhabitants ostensibly
because this would allow for their self-determination as mandated by the various General
Assembly resolutions on decolonization. Id. Yet most observers felt that the only reason
for Algeria's demand for a referendum was that it was generally believed Mauritania, the
weaker of the two competing powers, would win such a referendum. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19,
1975, § 1, at 8, col. 1. Algeria apparently was motivated by a desire to maintain the
balance of power in the region and adhered to the general view that were Morocco to gain
control of the phosphate-rich territory, this balance would be shifted.
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The Court announced its advisory opinion in October, 1975.
Spain agreed, in a pact entered into with Morocco and Mauri-
tania on November 14, to abandon the territory by the end of
February."9 In January, 1976, the General Assembly adopted Res-
olution 34581o which reaffirmed principles embodied in earlier
resolutions31 and "urged" that all parties involved "exercise re-
straint" and refrain from any unilateral action with respect to the
territory. The resolution noted the pact of November 14, and
requested that the parties to it "ensure respect for the freely
expressed aspirations of the Saharan populations."3 The referen-
dum called for by the General Assembly was never implemented.
At the end of February, 1976, Spain formally withdrew33 and,
pursuant to the pact, Morocco and Mauritania undertook joint
administration of the territory. 34
IX. THE COURT'S OPINION
In requesting the advisory opinion on the legal status of the
Western Sahara, the General Assembly presented two questions
for the Court's consideration:
I. Was Western Sahara (Ro de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at
the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no
one (terra nullius)?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative,
29. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
30. G.A. Res. 3458, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. -, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3458 (XXX), Jan.
16, 1976 (1976).
31. The resolution reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the people of Spanish Sahara
to self-determination" in accordance with Resolution 1514, supra note 10. It also re-
affirmed Resolution 1541, supra note 13, Resolution 2072, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 59,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), and Resolution 3292, supra note 3, at 104.
32. U.N. Doc. A/RES/3458 (XXX), Jan. 16, 1976, at 4.
33. Memorandum of Feb. 25, 1976 from the Spanish Government to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Press Release SG/SM/2306, Feb. 26, 1976, at 3.
34. Letter from Khatri Ould Said El Joumani, President of the Saharan Jemaa, to
the Secretary-General, contained within communication of Feb. 27, 1976, from the Perma-
nent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the Secretary General, Press Release NV/493,
Mar. 1, 1976, at 2-3. The letter stated, inter alia,
[T]he Saharan Jemaa, meeting in special session today, Thursday 26 February
1976 ...has unanimously approved the reintegration of the Territory of the
Sahara with Morocco and Mauritania, in conformity with historical realities
and with the links which have always united the Saharan population to these
two countries, and has expressed its full satisfaction and complete approval for
the decolonization of the Territory and its reintegration with Morocco and
Mauritania.
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II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?35
In a lengthy opinion, the Court declared unanimously that the
territory was not terra nullius when colonized by Spain. It also
decided that although legal ties existed between the predecessors
of the present inhabitants of the disputed territory and both Mo-
rocco and Mauritania, neither State was able to establish the
existence of a relationship strong enough to be considered a "tie
of territorial sovereignty."
A. The Requirement of a Terra Nullius
Territory may be considered terra nullius
either because no one has ever appropriated it-as in the case
of newly found land-or because, though once appropriated, it
has subsequently been abandoned."
It is a prerequisite to the acquisition of territorial sovereignty by
occupation that the land be terra nullius.3 7 Occupation is a mode
of acquiring sovereignty over territory, and is recognized in inter-
national law as an original or nonderivative mode. 8 It consists of
"the intentional appropriation by a state of territory not under
the sovereignty of any other state. '39 The test of effective occupa-
tion is not met by the mere existence of a physical settlement, but
by the nature of that settlement. Whiteman has characterized the
requisite presence as the "actual, continuous, and peaceful dis-
play of the functions of a state."" Consequently, the Court deter-
mined that it could find that the Western Sahara was terra
nullius at the time of Spain's colonization "only if it were estab-
lished that at that time the territory belonged to no-one in the
sense that it was then open to acquisition through the legal pro-
cess of 'occupation.' )N1
35. G.A. Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 103, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
36. 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1030 (1971).
37. Id.
38. Id. Other original modes are discovery and prescription. Id. at 1028-85. Derivative
modes include cession, conquest, and uti possiditis (the agreement of the parties to a
treaty to retain the territories each has acquired through war). Id. at 1086-1161. With
respect to the requirements for effective occupation, see text accompanying notes 91-95
infra.
39. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1940). "It does not involve
the transfer of sovereignty from one state to another." Id.
40. WHITEMAN, supra note 36, at 1031.
41. [1975] I.C.J. 39.
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The Court stated that habitation of a territory by tribes or
people "having a social and political organization" indicates that
the area is not terra nullius.42 It reasoned that the tribes inhabit-
ing the Western Sahara immediately prior to the start of Spanish
colonization were sufficiently organized, "socially and
politically, 43 to foreclose a terra nullius characterization. Based
upon agreements signed between Spain and the representatives
of these tribes,4 the Court held that the acquisition of the terri-
tory by Spain more closely resembled cession, a derivative mode
of acquisition, than occupution, an original mode.45
The Court noted, however, that the tribes were nomadic. "
While the Court did not seem concerned by this fact at this point
in its analysis, it did give it considerable weight toward the end
of the opinion when discussing the "overlapping" of the territories
"inhabited" by the tribes of the Mauritanian entity and those
of the Kingdom of Morocco. By the use of the term "overlap-
ping," the Court referred to the phenomenon of the crossing of the
migration routes of these nomadic tribes. The Court stated that
such overlapping "indicates the difficulty of disentangling the
various relationships existing in the Western Sahara region at the
time of colonization by Spain. 4 8 The Court further stated that
[t]his complexity was ...increased by the independence of
some of the nomads . . . .Nor is the complexity of the legal
relations of Western Sahara with the neighbouring territories at
thai time fully described unless mention is made of the fact that
the nomadic routes of certain tribes passed also within areas of
what is present-day Algeria. 9
The nomadic character of the tribes "inhabiting" the West-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In its Royal Order of December 26, 1884, far from treating the case as
one of occupation of terra nullius, Spain proclaimed that the King was taking
the Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis of agreements which had been
entered into with the chiefs of the local tribes; the Order referred expressly to
"the documents which the independent tribes of this part of the coast" had
"signed with the representatives of the Sociedad Espafiola Africanistas," and
announced that the King had confirmed "the deeds of adherence" to Spain.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 41.





ern Sahara at the time of the Spanish colonization cannot be
overlooked. It suggests the possibility that these tribes were not
the cohesive and well-defined entities which the Court portrays
in its discussion of whether the territory was terra nullius. This
distinction is important since one type of territory which may be
considered terra nullius, and therefore open to acquisition by
occupation, is territory inhabited by "individuals who are not
permanently united for political action."5 Hence, perhaps the
Western Sahara should have been considered terra nullius;5'
Spain's acquisition of sovereignty would then have been accom-
plished by the original mode of occupation, rather than by the
derivative mode of cession. The General Assembly only sought a
determination of whether Morocco or Mauritania had legal ties
to the territory, provided the Court reached a negative finding on
the terra nullius question. 2 Nevertheless, the Court indicated
that it would consider each question separately and indepen-
dently. 3 Therefore, although the Court would probably have
reached nearly the same conclusion with respect to the existence
of legal ties regardless of its determination of the first question,
the Court's analysis of the issue of terra nullius contains a basic
inconsistency.
B. The Extent of Legal Ties
Morocco asserted that ties of sovereignty existed between
itself and the territory on the basis of an immemorial possession
"based not on an isolated act of occupation but on the public
display of sovereignty, uninterrupted and uncontested, for
centuries."54 With this argument, Morocco attempted to bring
itself within the scope of the holding of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
Case.5
In that case, the Court was called upon to decide between the
conflicting claims of Norway and Denmark to the eastern coast
50. HACKWORTH, supra note 39, at 396.
51. This argument seems especially persuasive in light of the fact that the Court,
although finding the existence of "legal ties," held that such ties were not strong enough
to constitute ties of sovereignty between the contesting nations and the tribes of the
Western Sahara. [1975] I.C.J. 68.
52. Id. at 37.
53. Id. at 37-38.
54. Id. at 42.
55. [19331 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53.
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of Greenland. The Danish claims were not based upon any partic-
ular act of occupation; rather, title was founded "on the peaceful
and continuous display of State authority over the island. ' " Ac-
cording to the Court, since Norway had not established occupa-
tion until July 10, 1931, Denmark would merely need to establish
occupation sufficient to constitute sovereignty during the period
immediately prior to that date. After examining various Danish
activities indicative of the exercise of sovereignty, the Court held
that Denmark had successfully established valid title.57 It stated
that
a claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or
title such as a treaty of cession but merely upon continued dis-
play of authority, involves two elements each of which must be
shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and
some actual exercise or display of such authority.58
In addition, it observed that in the absence of a superior claim,
"'very little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign rights" is
necessary to establish sovereignty, especially in sparsely popu-
lated or uninhabited areas. 9
In Western Sahara, however, the Court found these princi-
ples inapplicable due to the "paucity of evidence of actual display
of authority unambiguously relating to Western Sahara. ... 0
It considered that the constant movement of nomadic tribes
through the region raised the issue of display of sovereignty in a
significantly different context from that of the Eastern Greenland
case6' and, in addition, found that the requirement of intent
enunciated in that case was clearly lacking. Relying on the
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 2 the Court stated that the period
immediately preceding the colonization by Spain was to be con-
sidered the relevant period. In that case, both France and the
United Kingdom asserted ancient or original title, which had
never been lost, over two groups of islets situated in the English
Channel. Various specific acts of sovereignty and indications of
56. Id. at 27.
57. Id. at 46.
58. Id. at 27-28.
59. Id. at 28. Most Danish acts of sovereignty were performed in the southern and
western regions of Greenland; these were deemed sufficient to exclude Norway's claims
to the northeastern coastal region.
60. 119751 I.C.J. 43.
61. Id.
62. [1953] I.C.J. 47. ;
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jurisdiction exercised by each of the States were examined, such
as the establishment of criminal proceedings, property tax assess-
ments, customs taxes, and boat registries, and the Court held
that sovereignty over both sets of islands belonged to Great
Britain.1
3
Morocco offered specific evidence concerning the coloniza-
tion of the Western Sahara and the period preceding it which the
Court agreed to consider. 4 The type of evidence enumerated in
the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, however, was not available with
regard to the Western Sahara. Neither permanent communities,
as in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, nor frontier settlements,
as in the Eastern Greenland case, existed in the desert terrain
which comprises the Western Sahara. Instead, nomadic tribes
traced routes through the territory. The situation did not lend
itself to the display of such finite acts of sovereignty as, for exam-
ple, property tax assessments.65 Consequently, the Court was
forced to rely upon an examination of ties of allegiance, ethnol-
ogy, culture, and religion as the basis of "legal ties," apparently
ties of a lesser degree than ties of sovereignty, between the terri-
tory of the Western Sahara and either or both of the States in-
volved. The Court also attempted to use sections of various treat-
ies to ascertain the existence and degree of spheres of influence."
It would thus seem clear, even before the Court began this analy-
sis, that while both parties would be able to meet the less rigorous
test of the existence of "legal ties," neither would withstand the
stricter traditional test which requires a display of acts of sover-
eignty.
The Court considered similar factors in evaluating the claims
of both Morocco and Mauritania. "Common religious links" are
not sufficient to prove the existence of a legal tie of sovereignty
or subordination to a ruler. Political ties, to be sufficient, must
be "manifested in acts evidencing acceptance of [a ruler's] polit-
ical authority." 9 The Court was not swayed by evidence of two
visits by the Sultan of Morocco to the territory in question be-
63. Id. at 72.
64. [19751 I.C.J. 43.
65. "Spain invokes the absence of any evidence of taxes by tribes of Western Sahara
and denies all possibility of such evidence being adduced .... " Id. at 46.
66. Id. at 44-46.
67. Id. at 49.
68. Id. at 44.
69. Id.
1976]
BROOKLYN J. INTL L.
cause they appeared to have been made in order to prevent com-
merce between the area tribes and the European powers, rather
than to display authority over the tribes. 0
Mauritania contended that the Bilad Shinguitti, the
predecessor to the modern Mauritanian entity,7' was a com-
munity having its own distinguishing characteristics and laws.7"
It emphasized the existence of clearly defined migration routes of
each tribe that spanned the Western Sahara as well as Mauri-
tania.73 Yet the Court found that these tribes could not meet the
test it had enunciated in an earlier case, that is, the tribes did
not form "an entity capable of availing itself of obligations in-
cumbent upon its Members,"74 and did not have the "character
of a personality or corporate entity distinct from the several emir-
ates and tribes which composed it. ' '7
5
The Court also examined treaties, agreements, and diplo-
matic correspondence pertaining to the Western Sahara, seeking
indications of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory. The treat-
ies, some dating from 1767, were commercial in nature, and each
contained a short reference to territory belonging to Morocco. For
example, an 1895 British-Moroccan agreement7" concerning the
sale of buildings in Terfaya, a Moroccan port city near the West-
ern Sahara border, contained two clauses which are representa-
tive of the various treaty clauses which the Court discussed.
I. If this Government buy the buildings, &c., in the place
above named from the above-named Company, no one will have
any claim to the lands that are between Wad Draa and Cape
Bojador, and which are called Terfaya above named, and all the
lands behind it, because all this belongs to the territory of
Morocco.
II. It is agreed that this Government shall give its word to the
English Government that they will not give any part of the
above-named lands to any one whatsoever without the concur-
rence of the English government.7
70. Id. at 46.
71. Id. at 57-58.
72. Id. at 59.
73. Id. at 59-60.
74. Id. at 63, quoting Advisory Opinion on Reparations for injuries suffered in the
service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174, 178.
75. [19751 I.C.J. 63.
76. Agreement between Great Britain and Morocco concerning the sale of property
in Terfaya, signed Mar. 13, 1895, 87 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS, 1894-1895, at 972.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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Wad Draa, Terfaya, and Cape Bojador form a line along the
southwestern coast of Morocco, continuing along the northwest-
ern coast of the Western Sahara. The phrase "all the lands behind
it" must necessarily include the land which today comprises the
Western Sahara. Thus it appears that Great Britain, in this
treaty, recognized the exclusive dominion of Morocco over the
territory. Nevertheless, the Court felt that treaties such as this
one represented agreements by Great Britain not to question any
future claims of the Sultan over these areas rather than a recogni-
tion of existing Moroccan sovereignty. "In short, what those pro-
visions yielded to the Sultan was acceptance by Great Britain not
of his existing sovereignty but of his interest in that area." 8
Other treaties referred to by the Court contain clauses in
which the Sultan of Morocco agreed to protect the captain and
crew of vessels shipwrecked at or near Wad Noun, an area within
the present Western Sahara territory.79 The Court rejected Mo-
rocco's contention that such shipwreck clauses are sufficient to
indicate that the other signatory recognized complete Moroccan
sovereignty; the language merely indicated a more limited degree
of control.8"
An 1856 British-Moroccan treaty," to which the Court did
not refer, would seem at first glance to be particularly instructive
since it explicitly states that certain areas lie within the dominion
of the Sultan of Morocco.
The Articles of this Convention shall be applicable to all the
parts in the Empire of Morocco; and should His Majesty the
Sultan of Morocco open the ports of Mehedea, Agadeer, or Wad-
noon [Wad Noun], or any other ports within the limits of His
Majesty's dominions, no difference shall be made in the levying
78. [19751 I.C.J. 54.
79. General Treaty between Great Britain and Morocco, signed Dec. 9, 1856, 46
BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS, 1855-1856, at 176; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between Spain and Morocco, signed Nov. 20, 1861, 53 BRrr. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS, 1862-
1863, at 1089; Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States and Morocco,
signed Sept. 16, 1836. 24 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS, 1835-1836, at 702.
80. Clearly, Morocco is correct in saying that these provisions would have
been pointless if the other State concerned had not considered the Sultan to be
in a position to exercise some authority or influence over the people holding the
sailors captive. But it is quite a different thing to maintain that those provisions
implied international recognition by the other State concerned of the Sultan as
territorial sovereign in Western Sahara.
[19751 I.C.J. 53.
81. Convention of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Morocco,
signed Dec. 9, 1856, 46 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS, 1855-1856, at 188.
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of duties, or anchorage, between the said ports and other ports
in the Sultan's dominions.82
The language employed in this agreement demonstrates, at least
as well as that found in any of the treaties the Court discussed, a
recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over some portion of the
Western Sahara. Mehedea and Agadeer refer to port cities on the
Moroccan coast. However, the ambiguity inherent in the use of
geographic terms such as Wad Noun makes it somewhat difficult
to determine the extent of the Moroccan dominion delineated.
The name Wad Noun appears in a number of treaties advanced
by Morocco in support of its claim that the signatories had
acceded to Moroccan dominion over the entire area which consti-
tutes the present-day Western Sahara.
The Court noted that during the period in which the various
bilateral treaties were executed there were two possible interpre-
tations of "Wad Noun." The first, a more restrictive meaning,
apparently indicated an area immediately surrounding the port;
the second, more expansive in nature, signified an area including
the Sakiet El Hamra, the entire northern region of the Western
Sahara.8 The Court found that Morocco failed to establish that
the more expansive meaning was intended by the use of the term
in the various treaties.84 This ambiguity was not the determining
factor in the Court's rejection of the various treaties offered in
support of Morocco's proposition, 5 and illustrates the limited
value of presenting treaties drafted more than seventy-five years
ago as proof in territorial sovereignty disputes.
The Court was unimpressed by claims of common religious
links, political ties, and treaty clauses allegedly indicative of rec-
ognition of sovereignty over the Western Sahara. It concluded
that the relationship between both Morocco and Mauritania and
the territory merely amounted to legal ties and not those of sover-
eignty.
C. Theories of Territorial Acquisition
The principles enunciated by the Court in its Western
Sahara opinion develop existing theories of territorial acquisi-
82. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
83. [19751 I.C.J. 52.
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 49-55.
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tion. In addition to occupation, 6 discovery and prescription ' are
two other modes traditionally classified as original modes of ac-
quisition.m However,
according to the view that has prevailed . . . since the 19th
century, an inchoate title of discovery must be completed within
a reasonable period by the effective occupation of the region
claimed to be discovered.
An inchoate title . . . cannot prevail over a definite title
founded on continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. 9
86. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
87. Oppenheim describes prescription as
the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory through continuous and undis-
turbed exercise of sovereignty over it during such period as is necessary to create
under the influence of historical development the general conviction that the
present condition of this is in conformity with international order.
1 L. OPPENHEIM. INTFRNATONAT, LAw 576 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). Prescription may take
one of two forms. Extinctive prescription refers to "the loss of a claim by failure to
prosecute it within a reasonable time," and acquisitive prescription refers to "a title
acquired through a lapse of time." WHITEMAN, supra note 36, at 1062.
The requirements for acquisitive prescription are similar to those necessary for effec-
tive occupation in that both require the continuous and uninterrupted exercise of the
authority of a sovereign over the area. However, "whereas occupation is a means of acquir-
ing territory which is res nullius, prescription is a means of acquiring territory which is
subject to the sovereignty of another state." Id. at 1066. Thus the title of the party is
established at the expense of the title and rights of the previous possessor. "Display of
authority by the one party, acquiescence in that display by the other party-those are the
sina qua non of acquisitive prescription." Id. at 1064. The possession must be public since
acquiescence is essential. Although acquiescence can be implied, "without knowledge
there can be no acquiescence at all." Id. at 1065.
This concept of international law is applicable to interstate boundary disputes within
the United States. Each state is viewed as an independent sovereign asserting claims to
the contested territory. Principles of international law, and especially acquisitive prescrip-
tion, are relevant. As the Supreme Court stated in a boundary case, Arkansas v.
Tennessee,
"It is a principle of public law universally recognized, that long acquiescence in
the possession of territory and in the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over
it, is conclusive of the nation's title and rightful authority" [quoting Indiana
v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 510 (1890)] ....... [Long acquiescence in the
assertion of a particular boundary and the exercise of dominion and sovereignty
over the territory within it, should be accepted as conclusive" [quoting
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 53 (1906)] ....
310 U.S. 563, 569 (1940). See generally Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593, 613
(1933); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1926); New Mexico v. Colorado, 267
U.S. 30, 41 (1925); Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 1, 41-44 (1910); Indiana v.
Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 518 (1890); Missouri v. Iowa, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 660, 677 (1849).
88. WHITEMAN, supra note 36, at 1028-85.
89. Palmas Island Arbitration (Netherlands-United States), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 846,
869 (1928).
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Modern usage recognizes the principle that mere physical discov-
ery or visual apprehension is sufficient per se "to establish a right
of sovereignty over, or a valid title to, terra nullius."90
The exact degree of occupation necessary to establish sover-
eignty over an area would appear todepend upon the circumstan-
ces of the case. The Clipperton Island Arbitration Award," one
of the landmark decisions in the area of occupation, has been
referred to as an example of the "elasticity of the notion of
occupation."92 The King of Italy acted as the arbitrator of a dis-
pute between France and Mexico concerning sovereignty over the
island. The only actual displays of State activity by France were
a proclamation of sovereignty over the island, an unsuccessful
attempt by a French naval vessel to reach the shore, and a protest
to the United States following the discovery of a group of Ameri-
cans collecting guano on the island. Mexico claimed the island
had already belonged to it prior to France's proclamation of
sovereignty.
The dispute was decided in France's favor on the basis of the
proclamation coupled with what the arbitrator considered to be
effective occupation. Yet in Lauterpacht's view, there was no
"initial taking of possession in the ordinary sense of the word." 3
There was merely a symbolic act-the proclamation-and one
unsuccessful attempt to reach shore. Lauterpacht surmised that
as a result of this decision
the notion of occupation, as traditionally understood, may be
valueless, in relation to some areas, for the purpose of acquiring
title. Such areas are not only those which are uninhabited, but
also those which are normally uninhabitable.
[E]ffectiveness [of occupation] is not a magic formula which
can be applied with mathematical precision. It is effectiveness
relative to the situation and to the circumstances. It may range
from the requirement of intensive administration in every 'nook
and corner' in a densely populated and developed area to mere
'state activity' manifesting itself in the conclusion of treaties
and conferment of concessions by an authority situated in a
90. A. KELLER, 0. LISSITZYN, & F. MANN, CREATION OF RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY
THROUGH SYNiOic Acts. 1400-1800, at 148 (1938).
91. Clipperton Island Arbitration (France-Mexico), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1107 (1931).





narrowly circumscribed part of the territory or even outside it;
and it may even assume the form of a mere proclamation.94
Other commentators have expressed similar views. One
writer stated that the Clipperton Island award in effect held that
"the occupation which is required is such an occupation as is
appropriate and possible under the circumstances. It is a question
of fact. This is a realistic and altogether satisfactory solution from
the legal point of view."95 In light of the principles embodied in
the Clipperton Island decision, the Court seemed inclined to con-
clude in Western Sahara that neither the clearly defined and
periodic migration routes of the tribes of the region,96 nor the
numerous treaties referring to areas of the Western Sahara," con-
stituted sufficient manifestations of ownership to confer sover-
eignty upon either Morocco or Mauritania. It therefore appears
that the Western Sahara opinion retrenches from the above-
mentioned standards of effective occupation, or at the very least,
unnecessarily limits their application.
III. THE VALUE OF THE ADVISORY OPINION
An advisory opinion of the Court is not formally binding on
the parties.9 s Its purpose is to clarify "the legal issues involved in
disputes between States," and in this manner to assist the Gen-
eral Assembly in mediating the controversy. 9  Advisory opinions
do, however, have "persuasive character and substantive author-
ity." ' They represent "judicial pronouncements of the highest
international tribunal"; ' both the Court itself 02 and the General
Assembly' 3 have regarded advisory opinions as authoritative ex-
pressions of law constituting authority equal to that of judgment.
According to Rosenne,
94. Id. at 417-18, 429 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
95. Dickinson, The Clipperton Island Case, 27 Am. J. INT'L L. 130, 133 (1933).
96. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
98. M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-42, at 511
(1943); Hambro, The Authority of the Advisory Opinions of the L C.J., 3 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 1, 5 (1959).
99. D. PRATAP. THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 229-34 (1972).
100. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Interna~tional Court of Justice:
International Organizations and Tribunals, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 55 (1952).
101. PRATAP. supra note 99, at 231.
102. Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No.
5 at 29.
103. G.A. Res. 294, U.N. Doc. A/1043, at 16 (4th Sess. 1949); G.A. Res. 1731, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 17, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962).
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the practical difference between the binding force of a
judgment, which derives from specific provisions of the Charter
and Statute apart from the auctoritas of the Court, and the
authoritative nature of an advisory opinion possessed of that
same auctoritas, are not significant.' 4
The General Assembly, in requesting an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice, sought a statement that
would decisively answer the questions posed concerning the ties
of sovereignty with the area, and perhaps provide a basis for a
negotiated settlement supervised by the United Nations. In the
Court's own words,
the materials and information presented to [the Court] do not
establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory
of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauri-
tanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such
a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV)
in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of
the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine
expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory . . . .
Since the Court was unable to find any relationship constituting
ties of sovereignty between either of the contesting States and the
Western Sahara, it in effect returned the controversy to the Gen-
eral Assembly, thereby rendering the non-binding nature of the
advisory opinion of no real import.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court was inconsistent in devoting a lengthy discussion
to the clearly nomadic nature of tribes inhabiting the Western
Sahara and, at the same time, holding that the Western Sahara
could not be considered terra nullius since it was inhabited by
socially and politically well-defined tribes. Tenuous reasoning
was also used to find that principles enunciated in the Legal
Status of Eastern Greenland Case was inapplicable due to
both the present factual setting and to principles stated in the
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case. Finally, although the degree of oc-
cupation demonstrated by the parties would appear at least
equivalent to that manifested by France in the Clipperton Island
104. S. ROSENNE. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 747 (1965). See
also S. ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 113 (1957).
105. [19751 I.C.J. 68.
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dispute, the Court held that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had
established effective occupation over the territory of the Western
Sahara. Consequently, by deeming well-established principles of
international law concerning the acquisition of sovereignty to be
inapplicable to the Western Sahara, the Court has unnecessarily
modified these principles and limited their scope.
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